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1) Material a priori and emotional a priori
in the introduction of the second edition of his early work Transcen-dental and Psychological Methods in 1922, Scheler admits his own 
ties and that he is theoretically indebted to the «ontological and realis­
tic meaning of the essential elements of the world of the spirit»in Hus­
serl’s Logical Investigations.1 At the same time, however, he under­
lines his own detachment from Husserl’s famous transcendental shift in 
1913, which was stigmatised as being characterised by the «idealistic 
meaning» and by «conscience immanence».2 Husserl countered these 
af­firmations­with­his­own­accusations.­In­the­conference­Phänomenol-
ogie und Anthropologie in 1931, Scheler was criticised for having used 
Logical Investigations in the direction of ontological idealism, trans­
forming­ the­eidetic­ reflection­ into­naive­metaphysics­«instead­of­ fol­
lowing the internal tendency of the investigations aimed at the forma­
tion of subjectivity».3 Similarly, in a famous letter to Löwith written in 
February 1937, Husserl accused Scheler (together with Heidegger and 
the early pupils) of not having «understood either the authentic and pro­
found meaning of the phenomenology, the transcendental meaning that 
is the only one possible, or how much depends on this meaning».4
1  Cf. M. sCheler, Die transzendentale und die psycologische Methode, in Gesammelte 
Werke (published by Francke Verlag until 1986 and then by the Bonn publisher, Bouvier; 
named hereafter GW listed with progressive numbers), I, Bern/München 1971, 201.
2 Ibid.
3  e. husserl, Phänomenologie und Anthropologie, in Husserliana XXVII (hereafter 
called Hua and listed with progressive numbers), Dordrecht/Boston/London 1989, 180.
4  K. löwiTh, Eine Erinnerung an Edmund Husserl, in l. Van breda and J. TaMini-
aux (edd.), Edmund Husserl 1859-1959, Den Haag 1959, 48.
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However,­ as­Ulrich­Melle­ observed,­ although­ it­ is­ difficult­ to­ es­
timate­how­much­influence­it­actually­had,­it­played­an­important­role­
in Husserl’s ethics, in particular during his period in Freiburg, in the 
revival and development of important concepts by Scheler including 
those – which play a key role in our analysis – of value, person, voca­
tion (Ruf) and community; these concepts come from the earlier period 
of Göttingen but above all, that originate from the common matrix of 
Brentano’s lesson.5­In­the­following­reflections­we­shall­try­to­see­how,­
despite the evident differences and reciprocal controversial evaluations, 
reasons for a profound theoretical vicinity between Husserl and Scheler 
are actually to be found around the central issue of a phenomenology of 
the emotions.
In Lehre von der Drei Tatsachen, Scheler claims that the phenomeno­
logical fact, «is an immanent given, that is, one that is contained in an 
experience in which what is “understood” and what is “given” coin­
cide»6 and in a very similar passage of Formalismusbuch, one can read 
that «only in the coincidence of “understanding” and “givenness” does 
5  For more about Husserl’s explicit allegations of contempt towards Scheler in con­
trast with the constant presence of Schelerian motives in the Freiburg period see: 
u. Melle, Schelersche Motive in Husserl Freiburger Ethik, in G. PfafferoT (ed.), 
Vom Umsturz der Werte in der modernen Gesellschaft, Bonn 1997, 203­205. In a 
letter to Adolf Grimme dated 4 May 1917 Scheler claims that, «only Franz Brentano 
influenced­me­directly.­(...)­With­the­exception­of­my­person­that­is­connected­from­
a philosophical point of view only extremely relatively to Husserl, the so­called 
“Phenomenology” is an overall work in which greatly different powers are at work», 
(quoted in G. CusinaTo, Katharsis. La morte dell’ego e il divino come apertura al 
mondo nella prospettiva di Max Scheler, Napoli 1999, 32). For an interpretation that 
tries to make Scheler coincide with Husserl’s phenomenology, see: M. Gabel, Inten-
tionalität des Geistes. Der phänomenologische Denkansatz bei Max Scheler. Untersu-
chung zum Verständnis der Intentionalität, Leipzig 1991. For criticism of Husserl in 
Logik I, withdrawn from publication by Scheler in 1906, see: G. ManCuso, Il giovane 
Scheler (1899-1906),­ Milano­ 2007,­ 198-219.­ Despite­ the­ continuous­ fluctuation­
between positive and negative judgements, see the emphasis given by Scheler in Die 
deutsche Philosophie der Gegenwart, GW VII, 308, to Investigation VI and to the 
concept of categorial intuition, which was the fruitful beginning of the «spiritual asso­
ciation» with Husserl; on this subject see also: h. sPieGelberG, The phenomenological 
Movement. A Historical Introduction, The Hague /Boston/London 1982, 268­269; a. 
sanders, Mensch - Subjekt - Person. Die Dezentrierung des Subjekts in der Philoso-
phie Max Schelers, Bonn 1996, 65­73.
6  M. sCheler, Lehre von der Drei Tatsachen, GW X, 433; cf. id., Phänomenologie 
und Erkenntnistheorie, GW X, 398.
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the content of the phenomenological experience become known».7 Ac­
cording to Scheler, the coincidence between understanding and given­
ness implies that the content of the phenomenological experience is 
an intuitive content, a direct understanding of what is essential. Even 
a perceptive illusion, such as a puppet being mistaken for a living be­
ing, can only occur on the bases of the premise of already being able to 
grasp the essential aspect, that of vitality. «An intuition of this kind is 
an “eidetic intuition”, in other words, a “phenomenological intuition” 
or a “phenomenological experience”».8 According to Scheler, the phe­
nomenological experience is therefore an understanding of essence, 
essence proves to be the structure the thing needs, which appears in 
its typical characteristics: the characteristic structure of identity of the 
thing that emerges as it manifests itself as a phenomenon.9 
In his 1907 lessons entitled Idea of Phenomenology, when dis­
cussing phenomenological reduction Husserl states that it must limit 
itself to «the sphere of pure direct givenness […] to the sphere of what 
precisely in the sense it is understood is also given, and directly given 
in the most rigorous meaning, so that nothing of what is understood is 
not also given».10­We­shall­look­more­closely­later­at­the­different­mean­
ing and different development of the theme of reduction in Scheler and 
Husserl; for now, we shall merely underline the fact that what emerges 
for both is the central theme of eidetic analysis: the emergence of the 
phenomenon as a characteristic of objective necessity, of not being able 
to be anything other than what is expressed in its essential content.11 
7  M. sCheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, GW II, 
70. In a note on the quoted page in Formalismus Husserl­had­highlighted­significantly­
the expression immanent experience (immanente Erfahrung), (cf. e. husserl, Rand-
bemerkungen zu Schelers Formalismus. Édition et traduction de Heinz Leonardy, 
«Ètudes Phénomenologiques», 13­14 (1991), 10.
8  M. sCheler, GW II, 68.
9  Cf. r. de MonTiCelli, C. Conni, Ontologia del nuovo, Milano 2008, 10­11.
10  e. husserl, Die Idee der Phänomenologie. Fünf Vorlesungen, Den Haag 1973, 
60­61.
11  Cf. M. sCheler, Vom Wesen der Philosophie und der moralischen Bedingung des 
philosophischen Erkennens, GW V, 75: «Husserl distinguishes – basically exactly in 
the same manner as myself later – the evident essential content of knowledge from 
real knowledge».
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Seeing the phenomena means grasping the real givenness of the ac-
tual thing in the essential aspects of its different manifestive structures, 
such as, for example, as is the case when we intuitively understand that 
a landscape is perceived as essentially different in comparison to the 
same landscape we remember or a landscape we have simply imagined.
However, as regards the relationship between Husserl and Scheler, 
there­ is­one­significant­difference­ that­may­already­be­highlighted:­ it­
regards the actual givenness of the essential reality as something that 
is pre­established ideally, in relation to the intuitive faculty itself, the 
intuitive­subjective ability it corresponds to. As claimed by Scheler, the 
a priori principle prevails, according to which, «the essentialities and 
their relationships are “given prior to” any experience»,12 together with 
the assumption according to which, «the order of foundation in which 
the phenomena attain givenness […] is based on their essence that is not 
already based on an intellect».13 As regards the latter, I do not believe 
there­is­any­significant­difference­to­Husserl’s­position­whereas­the­same­
cannot­be­said­as­far­as­the­former­is­concerned.­What­emerges­from­
Logical Investigations­and­does­not­appear­to­be­sufficiently­clear­in­the­
first­part­of­the­Formalismusbuch, and more generally in Scheler’s phe-
nomenological realism is the structural principle of correlation between 
subject and object that underlies the manifestation according to objec­
tive, necessary laws of the object, of the phenomenon, in its essential 
characteristics. As claimed by Husserl’s analysis, which he is to call 
transcendental after the famous shift in 1913, it is only on the basis 
of this essential correlation that the structural­intentional differences 
can emerge continuously between what is described as a subjective­
noet ic aspect and the objective­noematic aspect; for example, as occurs 
between the countless possible cases, when we distinguish between the 
mental process of a memory or a mental process of a perception of the 
same object, and between the different ways the object appears, as re­
membered in comparison to how it was originally perceived.14
12  GW II, 68.
13  M. sCheler, Phänomenologie und Erkenntistheorie, GW X, 383.
14  Scheler initially seems to be aiming at an ontological rigidity that ignores the cru­
cial aspect of intentional analysis, as the essence is almost hypostatized as a reality in 
itself that has to be perceived intuitively. It must be said, however, that already in the 
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However, in the phenomenological­sense,­the­first­starting­point­that­
makes Scheler similar to Husserl is, without a doubt, the criticism of 
the formalistic aspect of Kant’s a priori: according to Husserl, it is the 
things themselves that are shown, that appear in the necessity of their 
essential characteristics: for example, when we state that «a colour can-
not be something that has a colour, or a colour cannot be without a cer-
tain extension covered by it».15 Here, phenomenological analysis is ex­
pressing a need that is anything but just formal. Saying that every col­
our belongs to an extension does not mean admitting a formal empirical 
generalisation but rather showing which conditions are necessary for us 
to perceive something as a colour and express ourselves meaningfully 
around it. In this sense, Kant’s famous example of analytical proposi­
tion, «all bodies are extended»16 should actually be understood, in a rad­
ically different semantic contest, as a synthetic proposition a priori, be­
cause it is through this that an a priori necessary meaning is expressed – 
that of the extension of the bodies – in synthesis with the direct content 
of a perceptive experience.
As in Kant, the opposition is therefore not between the analytical and 
synthetic, but between form and material. Scheler states that, «the do­
main of the evident a priori does not coincide with that of the “formal”, 
the contrast between “a priori” and “a posteriori” has nothing to do with 
second part of 1916 in Formalismus, as we shall see more clearly when discussing 
the subject of the affective perception of values, this rigidity gradually diminishes. 
For example, in this regard there is an important note in which, whilst criticising 
Mach’s formal materialism, admitting the contentual relevance of the different es­
sences, Scheler claims that, «furthermore, Husserl also believes that the “noema” and 
the “noesi” condition one another reciprocally in their qualitative modality» (cf. GW 
II, 408). Finally, in the introduction of the third edition of the Formalismusbuch in 
1926, denouncing any misunderstanding that interpreted such autonomy of the values 
as a sort of ideal reality in itself, Scheler states explicitly in the introduction to the 
third edition in 1926 that he «dismisses on principle, like a body that is extraneous to 
the field of philosophy that paradise of ideas and values that exist “independently”, 
not only of the essence and possible fulfilment of spiritual and living acts – that exist 
“independently” not only of the human being and human consciousness, but also from 
the essence and fulfilment of a living spirit in general» (cf. GW II, 21).
15  e. husserl, Logische Untersuchungen (hereafter LU), II/1, Tübingen 1980, 253.
16 i. KanT, Kritik der reinen Vernunft,­Kants­Werke,­Band­III,­Berlin­1968,­34.
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that between the “formal” and “material”».17 The a priori is no longer 
understood in its connection with the «“forms of judgement” from 
which Kant derives “categories” as “functional laws” of “thought”».18 
The opposition between a priori and a posteriori must therefore be dis­
tinguished from that of the formal and material which is, according to 
Scheler, a relative opposition: «for example, the propo sitions of pure 
logic and the propositions of arithmetic are equally a priori. […] Nev­
ertheless, this does not stop the former being “formal” compared to 
the latter and the latter material compared to the former» but that if the 
former­are­to­be­verified­«a­plus­of­intuitive­material­is­necessary».19 
Accordingly, 2 x 2 = 4 is a general­formal proposition while 2 pears x 
2 pears = 4 pears expresses one of any possible intuitive contents of the 
first­proposition.20 Likewise, in assessing the weight of the material de­
termination compared to the logical­formal dimension, in his 1914 les­
sons on ethics Husserl states that, «light can be shed on the universality 
of the formal logical laws by the fact that the alge braic terms of the laws 
are determined materially; therefore just like the arithmetical proposi­
tion 3 + 3 = 6 which, when applied to the apples, becomes 3 apples + 3 
apples equals 6 apples».21
2) Feeling the values
This sort of a priori statue of essential reality, which conditions our 
object knowledge and the privilege it has with a material logic is then 
expressed in the continuation of the Formalismusbuch in which Scheler 
regards as the fundamental rational dimension: the dimension of the 
17  GW II, 72.
18  GW II, 68.
19  Cf. GW II, 72­73.
20  Cf. GW II, 73. 
21  e. husserl, Vorlesungen über Ethik und Wertlehre, Hua XXVIII, 39. However, 
it should be underlined that Husserl, unlike Scheler, to make his distance from Kant 
even clearer, also terminologically speaking, rarely uses the term material apriori or, 
in relation to it the expression of a priori synthetic laws, speaking instead material 
laws (cf. LU, II/1, § 11). In the rare places where the term material a priori does ap­
pear, cf. Hua XXVIII, 139 and Formale und transzendentale Logik, Hua XVII, Den 
Haag 1974, 134, where Husserl calls material a priori sachhaltiges Apriori, highlight­
ing its content aspect.
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personal sphere of emotional reality. «The emotional component of 
the person, their axiological feeling, preferences, loving, hating will 
also have an a priori original statue, unchanged by “thought”».22 Axio­
logical knowledge is based on the living relationship with that world, a 
relationship that is felt through the function of preferring (Vorziehn) or 
postposing (Nachsetzen) the values on the basis of that personal order 
which is made possible by the fundamental acts of love and hate.
As is generally known, in Scheler’s phenomenological vision affec­
tive experience is transformed into direct, intuitive feeling, without any 
kind of mediation of object representations, an intentional feeling in 
which the world is disclosed directly before us, «a world that […] man­
ifests itself exclusively in its aspects of value. […] The feeling in itself 
is already an “objectifying act” that requires absolutely no mediation of 
representation».23 Behind this stance is not only an implied criticism of 
Brentano, but also an echo of Husserl’s famous distinction in his Fifth 
Logical Investigation, between objectifying acts and non­objectifying 
acts in which every object corresponds to a representation of the object, 
whether real or imaginary. The non­objectifying acts, such as the class 
with desire and will, in which the relative feeling to values is also in­
cluded, would be «debtors», with their intentional reference, to the rep­
resentative capacity of the objectifying acts.24
   However, after Logical Investigations, once the distinction between 
objectifying and non­objectifying acts had been abandoned, Husserl 
also saw the question of the intentionality of feeling in a similar way to 
Scheler: that of feeling the values directly. In his lessons Grundfragen 
der Ethik 1902/1903 and then also immediately afterwards his Log-
ical Investigations, Husserl had already stated that «feeling (Gefühl) 
is linked to manifestation, and its object appears as a value».25 Later, 
in his lessons in 1908­1909, Über Grundprobleme der Ethik, as part 
of the problematical relationship between intellect and feeling, feeling 
22  GW II, 82.
23  GW II, 265.
24  Cf. LU II/1, 387­391; as regards the considerations that follow, bear in mind V. Ven-
ier, La norma fondamentale. Husserl e la fenomenologia dei valori, «Thaumàzein», 2 
(2014), 271­274.
25  Hua XXVIII, 410.
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(Gemüt)­ is­defined­as­a­modality­ that­ is­necessary­ to­access­values.26 
This admission of the particular nature of affective intentionality, in the 
fact it is able to relate objectively to values, thus going beyond the posi­
tion taken in Logical Investigations once and for all, is explicitly stated 
in­1913­in­the­first­volume­of­Ideen:
Der neue Sinn bringt eine total neue Sinndimension herein, mit 
ihm konstituieren sich keine neuen Bestimmungsstücke der blo­
ßen­“Sachen”,­sondern­Werte­der­Sachen,­Wertheiten,­bzw.­kon­
krete­ Wertobjektitäten:­ Schönheit­ und­ Haßlichkeit,­ Güte­ und­
Schlechtigkeit; das Gebrauchsobjekt, das Kunstwerk, die Ma­
schine, das Buch, die Handlung, die Tat usw.27
Here Husserl is in total agreement with Scheler who believes there 
is an intentional tie between feeling and value, an essential relationship 
between values and their being carried out: according to Scheler, feel-
ing values implies that «in conformance to their essence, values have to 
be able to manifest themselves in an axiological­emotional conscious­
ness».28
Both Scheler and Husserl therefore believe that there is a direct in­
tention to values, for example in the value of the beautiful in relation to 
aesthetic enjoyment, a case in which «the I wants to obtain the aesthetic 
object­in­itself­as­it­ is­a­specific­concrete­value­in­itself,­in­total­pure­
artistic pleasure».29 A kind of relationship that is not expressed through 
judgement or evaluation. Instead the value is perceived directly as such, 
according to what Husserl calls an «interest of the emotivity»:
26  Cf. Hua XXVIII, 249­255.
27  e. husserl, Ideen zur einer reinen Phänomenologie und phenomenologische 
Philosophie, Hua III/1, Den Haag 1976, 239­240; cf. ibid., 244: «all acts in general 
– also those of feelings or will – are “objectifying”, “constituting” originally the ob-
jects».
28  GW II, 270. The reason that both Husserl and Scheler are in total agreement about 
this point, appears to be the fact that feeling is, as e. franzini says in Filosofia del sen-
timento, Milano 1997, 158, «a horizon of constituting an objective sense, of founding 
the sense».
29  e. husserl, Erste Philosophie. Zweiter Teil: Theorie der phenomenologischen 
Reduktion, Hua VIII, Den Haag 1959, 104.
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Das Interesse kann aber auch ein Gemütsinteresse sein, ein im 
weitesten Sinn wertendes Interesse, die Intention ein wertthema­
tische,­das­Thema­ein­Wertthema,­Gemütsthema.­[...]­Der­Wert­
selbst­in­seiner­Wertwahrheit­wird­nicht­wahrgenommen;­was­für­
da­bloße­Ding­die­Wahrnemung­leistet,­ leistet­für­den­wert­die­
Wertnehmung.30
Furthermore, according to Scheler values are not reducible to an ego 
that carries them out as a sort of interior necessity of a moral conscious-
ness, «in human relationships and in history we are constantly grasp­
ing values that do not manifest themselves and have never manifested 
themselves in our ego».31 On the contrary, values have their own total 
independence; they are also present in the natural world and even an­
imals perceive the value of what is useful, what is harmful, pleasant or 
unpleasant.32 However, the decisive element that Scheler was to go on 
to develop of affective intentionality as an essential correlation to val­
ues is not yet clear in these statements; as we shall see, it underlies the 
formation of personal being as regards one’s own world, comprising the 
ethos, its load bearing structure.33 In Formalismus Scheler states that 
he has «also refused the theory according to which the being of values 
presupposes a “subject” or a “ego”, regardless of the fact that this is 
an empirical self or a so­called “transcendental ego”» and that the ego 
must be understood as a psychic reality that is exclusive to an interior 
experience, an egoità that as such, «remains an object of the axiological 
consciousness and is not necessarily the essentially necessary starting 
30  Hua VIII, 104.
31  GW II, 271.
32  Ibid. 
33­ ­As­G.­Cusinato­has­pointed­out,­in­the­first­part­of­Formalismus, «Scheler dwells 
excessively on the so­called “objectivity of values”», but one of the underlying ideas 
that is to gain importance in Scheler’s work is the one why «the will of the individual 
acts on an articulate background» and «this articulation is understood in feeling (Füh-
len) and preferring (Vorziehn)» values. In this manner the objectivity of the orien­
tation to values, far from being a reality in itself, actually depends on the person’s 
formation process in their ethical­affective sphere (cf. G. CusinaTo, Orientamento al 
bene e trascendenza dal sé. Il problema dell’oggettività dei valori in Max Scheler, 
«Verifiche», XL (2011), 43­44).
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part of the conscious one».34
Once again, this issue involves the relationship between Husserl and 
Scheler, and not just as regards terminology. According to Husserl, the 
description of the transcendental consciousness, which presupposes the 
action of phenomenological analysis, is the description of a field of in-
tentional relations in its absolute actuality and therefore anything but 
any kind of psychic substance. Furthermore, this topicality is not to be 
confused with a sort of ideal absolute actuality; it continuously conceals 
a passive part that is always submerged and functioning in which the in-
tentional life consists and its genesis is a fundamental constitutive part 
of the subjectivity itself: «everything that is actively present in the con­
sciousness, and, in correlation, the active having­consciousness, devot­
ing oneself­to, dealing­with, is always surrounded by an atmosphere of 
silent and hidden but implicitly functioning validity, by a living hori-
zon».35
This absolute nature, a sort of transcendental primacy, is therefore 
a long way from being a substantial dimension; it actually arises from 
the necessary intentional correlation between what is manifested and 
our experience of this.36 According to Husserl, if something exists, it 
only does so in as much as for us, «the transcendent being» is only 
given­through­specific­«connective­experiences»­of­ours,­and­it­is­only­
with such connections that it can acquire any existential meaning and 
be­clarified­phenomenologically.37 It is therefore a decisive fact on the 
34  Cf. GW II, 271.
35  e. husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale 
Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie, Hua VI, 
Den Haag 1976, 152. Cf. V. CosTa, Vita emotiva e analisi trascendentale in V. Mel-
Chiorre (ed.), I luoghi del comprendere, Milano 2000, 117; cf. a. laMberTino, Max 
Scheler. Fondazione fenomenologica dell’etica dei valori, Firenze 1996, 19­22.
36  As s. lufT observes in the Einleitung des Herausgebers to e. husserl, Zur phä-
nomenologischen Reduktion. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1926-1935), Hua XXXIV, 
Dordrecht/Boston/London 2002, XLVIII, «the givenness of the world may not be 
apodictically the evident, the being of the world is always predictable and subject to 
possible corrections. However, the fact that the world is given to a self is apodictical. 
World­and­self­belong­to­one­another­apodictically».
37  Cf. Hua III/1, 92. In La svolta in direzione delle cose­in­«Discipline­Filosofiche»,­
XX/2 (2010), 223, s. besoli rightly observed the fact that «the emphasised ontolog­
ical propensity of Scheler’s phenomenological essentialism nourishes what Husserl 
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basis of which the phenomenological description is always in contrast 
with any naturalisation of­the­conscience;­this­is­clearly­confirmed­by­
Husserl­in­the­first­book­of­Ideen when he says that the immanent being 
is «undoubtedly an absolute being in the sense that nulla re indiget ad 
existendum. On the other hand, the world of the transcendent res refers 
entirely to consciousness. But not a logically conceived consciousness 
but rather a current consciousness».38
One of Scheler’s main criticisms of Husserl in Idole der Selbster-
kenntnis,39 is­ that­of­having­ insufficient­understanding­of­ the­psychic­
ego, having preferred the internal to the exterior perception and thus 
ending­up­confusing­internal­perception­with­reflection.­According­to­
Scheler,­on­the­other­hand,­through­reflection­it­is­possible­to­thematise­
both the interior perception as a psychic object and the exterior percep­
tion regarding the physical dimension while, on the contrary, interior 
perception can never have exterior perception as its content.40  Edith 
Stein convincingly showed how that meaning of the structure of the ab­
solute givenness of the experience of consciousness we were referring 
to escaped Scheler entirely. It was precisely to avoid Scheler’s evident 
confusion that in Ideen I, Husserl was to decide to abandon the use of 
the expression interior perception once and for all, and to use the term 
reflection­in­the­transcendental meaning instead.41
3) Ethical reduction and phenomenological reduction
Husserl’s work contains an aspect that appears coherently through 
his whole philosophical life: the indissoluble tie between ethics and 
knowledge in the incessant fatigue of giving a continuous, rigorous crit­
ical­justification­to­one’s­own­theoretical­assumptions.­This­is­an­exer­
would have called dogmatism», breaking with the principle according to which each 
being is «relative to transcendental subjectivity» (cf. Hua XVII, 241). 
38  Hua III/1, 92.
39  Cf. M. sCheler, Die Idole der Selbsterkenntnis, GW III, 246­247, note I.
40  Cf. l. boella, Il paesaggio interiore e le sue profondità in M. sCheler, Il valore 
della vita emotiva, Milano 1999, 36­38.
41  Cf. e. sTein, Zum Problem der Einfühlung, Halle 1917, 34; cf. Hua III/1, § 78 
and V. Venier, L’altra persona. Note sul problema dell’empatia in Edith Stein e Max 
Scheler,­«Annuario­Filosofico»,­19­(2003),­328.
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cise that, on the one hand is translated more and more into a personal 
style, whilst becoming on the other, a progressive unfolding of what 
Husserl regards as the fundamental ethical motive of each true voca­
tion, a motive that essentially brings him closer to Scheler: the possi­
bility of the radical assumption in toto of the meaning of one’s own life 
in view of one’s own authentic personal transformation; Husserl says:
endlich kann Ich auch mein gesamtes Leben universal über­
schauen und für mein ganzes Leben Entschlüsse fassen, und in 
änlicher­Weise­wie­für­beschränkte­Lebensstrecken.­So­kann­ich­
eine universale Kritik meines ganzen bisherigen Leben üben und 
in eins damit mein ganzes künftiges Leben gestalten wollen: sei 
es unter dem Gesichtspunkt eines mir unbesehen geltenden uni­
versalen­Wertes,­wie­Macht,­Erfolg­u.­ dgl.,­ sei­ es­ im­obersten­
Sinne ethischer Selbstbesinnung, Selbstkritik und Selbstregie­
rung.42
This essential­personal aspect of radical criticism that holds together 
ethics­and­knowledge­is­also­reflected­in­Husserl­in­the­growing­impor-
tance given to the exercise of the epochè through transcendental reduc­
tion. In this regard, in Krisis, there­is­an­extremely­significant­step­in­
which the value of the epochè is highlighted as that of the gesture of 
rational freedom through which the inexhaustable task of phenomeno-
logical understanding is concretised. An interminable task in the face of 
an always functioning reality,­a­reality­that­is­stratified­in­the­most­hid­
den mazes of the living intertwining between subjectivity and already-
given world: the life world in which we live intuitively, a Heraclitean 
flow in which we are a part and which we continuously experience, a 
world, in the end, that has to be grasped and understood critically.
Es ist nun aber notwendig, sich wirklich einsichtig zu machen, 
daß es nicht bei einer bedeutungslosen habituellen Enthaltung 
bleibt, sondern daß mit ihr der Blick des Philosophen in der Tat 
erst­völlig­frei­wird,­und­vor­allem­frei­von­der­stärksten­und­uni­
versalsten und dabei verborgensten inneren Bindung, von derje­
nigen­der­Vorgegebenheit­der­Welt.­Mit­und­in­dieser­Befreiung­
ist gegeben die Entdeckung der universalen, in sich absolut ge­
schlossen­und­absolut­eigenständigen­Korrelation­von­Welt­und­
Weltbewußtsein.­Gemeint­ist­auf­der­letzeren­Seite­das­Bewußt­
42  Hua VIII, 154.
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seinleben­der­die­Welgeltung­leistenden­Subjektivität,­bzw.­der­in­
ihren­fortdauernden­Erwerben­jeweils­Welt­habenden­und­auch­
immer­aktiv­neu­gestaltenden­Subjektivität.43
However, the suspension of every world thesis, through phenomeno­
logical­reduction,­has­to­be­distinguished­from­the­radical­self-reflection­
about one’s own personal life. A radical critique that involves my entire 
previous life and therefore keeps it suspended, is directly involved, as 
we shall see later, with the radical possibility of personal renewal, a re­
newal­that­specifically­regards­the­sphere­of­my actions of my having to 
be absolute in relation to my entire personal practical­rational sphere44. 
In a critical note to his own concept of ethical epoché in the second part 
of Erste Philosophie, Husserl states that:
es ist von mir hier übersehen, daß die ethische epoché eine ganze 
andere­Üniversalität­hat­als­die­phänomenologische.­Sie­betrifft­
alle und jede Geltung, die in personalen Akten meines bisherigen 
Lebens ins Spiel Gesetzt war. Aber das sagt nicht: alle Geltungen 
überhaupt, die in mir ihren Ursprung hat z.B. die Seinsgeltung 
der­Welt­ ist­nicht­betroffen.­Aber­nicht­einmal­alle­ in­Ichakten­
überhaupt vollzogene Geltung.45
This is an extremely important distinction and precision that shows 
how Husserl also believes there is an ethical­personal aspect linked di­
rectly to the exercise of reduction, despite the oberved differences and 
Scheler’s criticism. In a passage in In Idealismus-Realismus he states 
that
denn­soll­das­Realitätsmoment­aufgehoben­werden,­damit­echtes­
Wesen­zutage­trete,­soll­jene­“Entwirklichung”­der­Welt­vorge­
nommen­werden,­die­auf­alle­Fälle­Bedingung­ihrer­Verwesentli­
chung ist, so muß vor allem klar sein, was denn­Realitätsmoment­
43  Hua VI, 154. As e. franzini points out in Husserl e il mondo della vita, in V. Mel-
Chiorre (ed.), Forme di Mondo, Milano 2004, 141­142, epoché­is­the­modification­of­
our attitude rooted in the common, natural meaning of the world, «in which the world 
of life may be unfolded like a kingdom of subjective phenomena that have remained 
anonymous».
44  Cf. V. Venier, La norma fondamentale..., 298­301.
45  Hua VIII, 319.
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selber ist, das wir durch die Reduktion abzustreifen haben, und 
worin dieses Moment gegeben ist.46
One of the answers to this question is to be found in Die Stellung 
des Menschen im Kosmos in­which­ Scheler­ defines­man­ as­ the­ «as­
cetic of life», the one who is able to put his own pulsional­vital tenden­
cies­between­brackets­and­to­suspend­that­gesture­of­self-affirmation­in­
which individuals, just like animals, seek their own vital satisfaction, 
coming up against the resistance of that desire, a resistance from which 
the effectiveness of reality originates. According to Scheler, this de-
realization procedure grants man, beyond the ties of the vital sphere, 
the liberation of his essential ideative abilities.47 These abilities go back 
to­what­was­defined­in­Idealismus-Realismus as knowing how to grasp 
the essence, the «being so» of things, their «So-sein» in contrast to their 
existence, their «Da-sein».48 The essence, the Sosein, is always present 
as a correlate of an intentional act, in which it is understood in total co­
incidence between thought and intuition. The existence (Dasein), what 
is real, on the other hand, always remains extramental and is only ac­
complishable as opposition, as resistence to acts of a volitive nature.49 
46  M. sCheler, Idealismus - Realismus, GW IX, 206­207. In Phänomenologie und 
Erkenntnistheorie (1913/14), Scheler, with a positive reference to Husserl, had also 
stated that «in a very essential point phenomenological philosophy is closely related 
to the so­called transcendental theory of knowledge. Its course continues in such a 
way that its results remain totally independent of the particular organisation of human 
nature, of the actual organisation of the bearers of the acts it is studying» (cf. GW X, 
394; cf. w. henCKMann, Schelers Lehre vom Apriori­in­W.­bauMGarTner (ed.), Gewis-
sheit und Gewissen,­Würzburg­1987,­123-124).­For­a­detailed­analytical­reconstruc­
tion of Scheler’s interpretation of transcendental reduction see also: w. henCKMann, 
Das Intentionalitäsproblem bei Scheler, in «Brentano Studien», 3 (1991), 217­225. 
On the double metaphysical and anthropological role of phenomenological reduction 
in Scheler as access to the essential world from the aspect of emancipation on the one 
hand, and from the constrictive­vital aspect on the other, cf. E. aVé-lalleManT, Die 
phenomenologische Reduktion in der Philosophie Max Schelers, in P. Good (ed.), 
Max Scheler im Gegenwartsgeschen der Philosophie, Bern 1975, 165­169.
47  Cf. GW IX, 40­45; cf. V. Venier, L’eterno confine, Venezia 2012, 79­81. 
48  Cf. GW IX, 185­186.
49  Such transcendency would be unthinkable for Husserl’s transcendental phe no­
menol ogy in which, on the contrary, there is a rigorous immanistic conception in 
which reality would make no sense without the direct intentional reference to the 
consciousness. As V. CosTa rightly says in Il cerchio e l’ellisse. Husserl e il darsi delle 
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Scheler states, «for me this principle is certainly the last and decisive 
conoscitive criterion that exists by far».50 Here Scheler goes back to the 
fundamental themes from Vom Wesen der Philosophie, in which the 
ideative abilility, that of knowing how to distinguish between essence 
and existence, corresponds to a conception of an intentional kind of 
knowledge as a kind of ontological participation.51 This is a knowledge 
that does not expect to assimilate the object in itself and neither does it 
expect to produce it. According to Scheler, the thinkability of the object 
is a relationship of essence, which leaves the existence unchanged: the 
ens intentionale is not to be confused with the ens reale. This relation­
ship reaches its highest value when it relates to the other as a person 
and­becomes­the­fulfilment­of­a­shared­act­through­sharing,­Mit-fühlen.
According to Scheler, authentic reduction is therefore that ascetic 
gesture that is able to make the spiritual­essential world emerge from 
the remotion of the reality that reveals itself in the experience of resis-
tance (Wiederstandserlebnis), a gesture of radical de­realisation of the 
tendencies­and­ forces­ that­constitute­ the­vital-pulsional­center.­When­
reality is abolished through its radical refusal, the ascesis of the living 
world­dimension­corresponds­to­the­flourishing­of­the­ideative­sphere,­
in which the essential aspect of things may be grasped. In the ideative 
sphere reality is transcended; in other words, the factual, constrictive 
aspect is transcended of the existence in which reality arises from the 
anguishing fight­of­organic­ life­with­ its­own­surroundings­ (Umwelt). 
The essential world thus reveals itself as a cathartic place in which the 
vital impulse may be cleansed of its irrational aspect.52
Scheler therefore believes that the ideative ability, the fundamental 
ability of understanding the essence of a thing, no matter what, is con­
nected to the emotional experience of the perception of value in its strat­
ifications­in­the­personal­value.­In­turn,­the­perception­of­value­is­the­
cose, Soveria Mannelli 2007, 26, note 14: «from a phenomenological­transcendental 
point of view this would allude to a rift between the phenomenon and being, and if 
that were the case it would make no sense to speak of reality that, deprived of its ref­
erence to consciousness is phenomenologically nothing».
50  M. sCheler, Vom Ewigen im Menschen, GW V, 17. Cf. GW IX, 185­186.
51  Cf. GW V, 68.
52  Cf. G. CusinaTo Katharsis..., 70­77.
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condition of a privileged access to reality: «the prehension of the value 
(Wertnehmung) always preceds perception (Wahrnehmung)».53 The 
axiological nuance, the values, completely prevade our access to real­
ity. How we determine our sense of our will and our action can there­
fore not prescind from the orientation towards values. Love and hate 
guide our understanding of values; they are always an underlying con­
dition and according to Scheler they are therefore what actually allows 
the­ values­ a­ cognitive­ relationship­with­ reality.­ «Wherever­ the­ lover­
precedes the acquaintance there is no reason for being (whether stars, 
plants, historical­effectual connections, divine things), the scrutiny of 
which has not gone through an emphatic phase before reaching that 
a-valuative analysis».54 First and foremost man is ens amans and only 
then ens cogi tans, love is die Weckerin zur Erkenntnis und zum Wollen, 
i.e. it awakens him to knowledge and desire.55 According to Scheler, 
darum war uns Liebe immer auch zugleich der Urakt, durch den 
ein Seiendes – ohne aufzuhören, dieses begrenzte Seiende zu 
sein – sich selbst verlaßt, um an einem anderen Seienden als ens 
intentionale so teilzuhaben und teilzunehmen, daß beide nicht ir­
gendwie­ reale­Teile­ voneinander­werden.­Was­wir­ “erkennen”­
nennen – diese Seinsrelation –, das setz immer dieses Akt voraus: 
ein­sich­und­seine­Zustände,­[...]­Verlassen,­ein­sie­Transzendie-
ren,­um­mit­der­Welt­ in­einen­Erlebniskontakt­der­Möglichkeit­
nach zu kommen.56
In such a relationship with the world, the authentic sense of love is 
also formed: love for the value of the person as «ethical love in a preg­
nant sense»,57 the essential meaning of which is to take part in the es­
53  GW VIII, 109­110.
54  GW V, 81.
55  Cf. Ordo amoris, GW X, 347­376. 
56  GW X, 356. In this essential passage of Ordo amoris G. CusinaTo sees, «calling 
into question the egological perspective» that makes it possible to leave one’s own 
individualistic dimension for the participative conversion to the other (cf. G. Cusina-
To, La totalità incompiuta. Antropologia filosofica e ontologia della persona, Milano 
2008, 200­201). Cf. also h. leonardy, Liebe und Person. Max Schelers Versuch eines 
“phänomenologischen” Personalismus, Den Haag 1976, 157­167.
57  Wesen und Formen der Sympathie..., GW VII, 67. Cf. G. ferreTTi, La trascend-
enza dell’amore. Saggi su Max Scheler, Milano 2014, 53.
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sence of the other, leaving him unaltered in his individual­personal ir­
reducibility.58
4) Personal renewal and formation
In his introduction of the second edition in 1921 of the Formalis-
musbuch, Scheler emphasises the importance of personal values: «all 
the values, including the real ones, and those of the community and 
impersonal organisations, have to be subordinate to the values of the 
person».59 The authentic value of the person is closely connected to the 
theme of the part of one’s individual formation in the continuous search 
for personal order, an order of values. In an important passage in Form-
alismus, it says that
das gesamte emotionale Leben als eine Ablauf kausal bewegter 
Zustände­zu­nehmen,­die­sinn-­und­ziellos­in­uns­abrollen:­dem­
gesamten emotionalen Leben jeden “ Sinn” und intenionalen 
“Gehalt” absprechen, dies konnte erst ein Zeitalter, in dem die 
Verwirrung der Herzen – der désordre du coeur – jenen Grad er­
reicht hatte wie in unserem Zeitalter.60
The passage immediately evokes the incipit of the contemporary 
text Ordo Amoris that was published posthumously, in which Scheler 
wondered whether it was possible to imprint an objectively correct order 
on the chaos of one’s own affective world, on the gestures of love and 
of hate.61 An order which, according to Scheler, has to be recognised as 
the order of value preferences that regulates our own relationship with 
the world. This system comprises the Ethos of­man.­«Whoever­has­the­
ordo amoris of a man, has the man».62­Whoever­knows­the­axiological­
58  Sounding remarkably like Scheler, in Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser 
Vorträge, Hua I, Den Haag 1950, 139, Husserl states that «if it were possible to gain 
access directly to the other in what is essentially theirs, then the other would merely be 
a moment that is essentially mine and, I and the other would be the same thing». Cf. V. 
Venier, L’esistenza in ostaggio. Husserl e la fenomenologia personale, Milano 2011; 
s. GallaGher, d. zahaVi, The Phenomenological Mind, New York 2008, 186­187.
59  GW II, 14. 
60  GW II, 267. 
61  Cf. GW X, 347.
62  Ibid., 348. About the meaning of the ordo amoris as the nucleus of ethos, cf. G. 
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dimension also knows the intimate essence. The ordo amoris is the fun­
damental Bestimmung of the human essence, the determination of the 
concrete possibilities in each individual life, the secret web that can be 
recognised as one’s true personal vocation.63
The ethical question whether there is a regulatory possibility for 
one’s own world of values and own rational-emotional dimension 
and whether such a possibility can be translated into the fundamental 
motiva tion to follow one’s own personal formation and the creation of 
an authentic vocation is the essential theoretical characteristic that 
Husserl and Scheler have in common.
The question of an ordre du coeur also appears in Husserl’s works at 
the beginning of the course on ethics in 1914 that asks itself:
Wie­soll­ich­mein­Leben­und­Streben­vernünftig­ordnen,­wie­dem­
quälenden­Zwiespalt­mit­mir­selbst­entgehen,­wie­dem­berechti­
gen­Tadel­der­Mitmenschen?­Wie­kann­ich­mein­ganzes­Leben­
zu einem schönem und guten gestalten und, wie der traditionelle 
Ausdruck lautet, wie die echte Eudaimonie, die wahre Glückse­
ligkeit, erlangen?64
Furthermore, one of the fundamental ethical themes «the general call 
(der allgemeine Ruf) of our tormented present»,65 which emerges in the 
writings he published in the journal Kaizo in 1923­1924 is that of the 
radical need for personal renewal. This is the need for a path that is in­
creasingly directed at conscious personal transformation, a path that 
must certainly and unequivocally be regarded as individual but also as 
the indispensable basis for any expansion in any kind of community 
form: «the renewal of man – of the individual man and of a shared hu­
ferreTTi, Max Scheler. Fenomenologia e antropologia personalistica, 259; cf. h. r. 
sePP, Max Schelers Begriff der Ethos, in C. berMes, w. henCKMann, h. leonardy 
(edd.), Person und Wert. Schelers “Formalismus” – Perspektiven und Wirkungen, 
München 2000, 89­90.
63  Cf. V. Venier, La vocazione personale. Max Scheler e l’Ordo Amoris, in G. Cus-
inaTo (ed.), Max Scheler. Esistenza della persona e radicalizzazione della fenomeno-
logia, Milano 2007, 163­176.
64  e. husserl, Fünf Aufsatze über Erneurung, Hua XXVII, 11; cf. V. Venier, Gov-
erning emotions. Husserl and Personal Vocation, «Phenomenology and Mind», 5 
(2013), 99.
65  Hua XXVII, 3.
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manity – is the supreme theme of any ethics. Ethical life is, in its very 
essence, a life that is consciously subject to the idea of renewal, and it 
is by this that it is voluntarily guided and formed».66
What­became­more­and­more­important­for­Husserl,­probably­from­
1915 on when he began writing the second book of Ideen, was the de­
termining role of motivation as a decisive component in the formation 
of identity and personal individuality in relation to values and their di-
rect preference:
Was­als­Motiv­wirkt,­birgt­in­sich­vielerlei­intentionale­Implika­
tionen; hier liegt selbst eine Quelle wichtiger neuer Motivatio­
nen:­dem­eigentlichen­Sinn­und­der­Bewährung­der­Herausfin­
dung­der­ “Wahrheit­ selbst”­ nachgehen­und­ sich­ in­ echter­Ver­
nunft durch sie bestimmen lassen. Da liegen die vorzüglichen 
Werte,­davon­hängt­der­Wert­ aller­Motivationen­und­der­ aktu­
ellen­Taten­letzlich­ab.­[...]­Den­höchsten­Wert­repräsentiert­die­
Person, die habituell dem echten, wahren, gültigen, freien Ent­
schließen höchste Motivationskraft verleiht.67
It is therefore not only the centrality of the perception of value in 
relation to the personal formation that progressively takes on more im­
portance in Husserl’s phenomenology, but also the actual pervasiveness 
of the value in the world of cultural knowledge and formation:
Alle­ Kulturwissenschaften­ im­ spezifischen­ Sinn­ der­ Wissen­
schaften von der Kulturgebilden haben statt bloßer Natur mit 
Prädikaten­bloßer­Natur­gerade­solche­aus­dem­Gemüt­stammen­
den, also auf das wertend und wollend gestaltende Subjekt zu­
rückweisende­Prädikate­in­ihrem­tematischen­Bereich.68
According to Husserl, there is therefore also an essential interweav­
ing between reason, emotion, desire and will that pivot around the uni­
fying theme of value. Husserl also believes that the value precedes and 
informs heterogeneous but interlinked experiences about itself, for ex­
ample such as when we state that «what is beautiful is also good; each 
66  Hua XXVII, 20. Cf. u. Melle, Schelersche Motive in Husserls Freiburger Ethik, 
205.
67  e. husserl, Ideen zur einer reinen Phänomenologie und phenomenologische Phi-
losophie. Zweites Buch, Hua IV, Den Haag 1952, 268.
68  Hua VIII, 25.
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good, if it does not exist is a value of desire, if it can be created, is a 
value of will».69
In comparison to Scheler, in Husserl’s work a practical­rational in­
stance prevails that is subordinate to knowledge, but rather than present 
itself as an antinomy towards Scheler’s fundamental emphasis on the af­
fective sphere of values, we see it as a complementary theoretical aspect 
in which feelings and reason can merge into a real phenomenol ogy of 
emotions. The emotive sphere, in which the value is favoured straight­
away, for example that of the desire of pure satisfaction «is founded in 
the consciousness of having achieved its own objective».70 The value, 
the real order of values, therefore requires the exercise of knowledge, 
the ability of justifying one’s own personal acquisitions to oneself and 
the others, whether regarding the affective, practical or cognitive sphere:
Aber­verantwortet­wird­letztlich­die­Echtheit­des­Wertes­und­die­
Wahrheit­ im­Erkennen­der­Erzielung,­ das­ in­Urteilseinstellung­
und­in­seinen­logischen­Formen­über­Wert­prädiziert­und­einsich­
tig­die­zufällig­vorliegende­Wertanschauung­auf­generell­einsich­
tige­Wertnormen­zurückbezieht­und­dadurch­eine­höhere­Verant­
wortung, als Erkenntnisverantwortung, gewinnt.71
However, the decisive motive is that of the value of individual forma­
tion in the interweaving between conscious will and personal renewal 
within a practical life that is completely rational in relation to the oth­
ers. Also in cases in which action is in reference to intellectual knowl­
edge, Husserl always sees ethics as the true thematic terrain. The search 
in itself and one’s own self­motivation in its becoming and consolida­
tion, is inevitable regarding the relation of the other: «in the aim of true 
love, understood as a seeking that loves and a creation that arouses its 
true Self, the aim of the love for one’s neighbour is enclosed, which the 
neighbour actually needs in his seeking­him­self and recreating him­
self».72­The­ideal­in­itself,­fulfilling­one’s­own­true­vocation – if really 
69  Hua XXVIII, 48. 
70  Hua VIII, 25.
71  Ibid.
72  e. husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik. Vorelsung Sommersemester 1920/1924, Hua 
XXXVII, Dordercht/Boston/London 2004, 241.
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rational – has to refer to the Lebensgemeinschaft, the Community life 
where­ they­can­find­confirmation,­ interweave­and­ stimulate­ the­ indi­
vidual motivations, the individual, personal vocations, «living a per­
sonal life means living as self and as us, sharing a common horizon».73
According to Scheler, and not unlike Husserl, «man is an entity whose 
manner coincides with the decision that has not yet been taken, about 
what he wants to be and to become».74 However, Scheler also believes 
that what is determined in the life of an individual is regardless of how 
he lives, acts, believes, and hopes with others (der Form eines Mitein-
ander-lebens, -handelns, -glaubens, -hoffens, -bildens). «The idea of 
individual destination therefore includes reciprocal solidarity from the 
moral subjects that are responsible for both the blame and merits, not 
from the outside, but in itself».75 The relational interweaving between 
people, with their own disfunctions, harmony and contradictions, rep­
resents the true background of the ordo amoris that involves the process 
of self­formation (Selbstbilding) of the personal being directly in rela­
tion to the order of one’s own values. Both Husserl and Scheler offer 
the same background: that of the essential search of the meaning and 
the value itself of one’s own personal existence. An untiring search that 
can only take place through the continuous attempt to form and renew 
the governing of self and one’s own authentic vocation, a vocation that 
hides the crucial question of a happy existence, a fulfilled existence, in 
relation to oneself and to others.
AbstrAct
Despite the clear differences and reciprocal controversial evaluations, extreme sim­
ilarities are to be found in Husserl and Scheler’s theory regarding the central ques­
73  Hua VI, 314.
74  GW IX, 150. Cf. l. landGrebe, Geschichtphilosophische Perspektiven bei Scheler 
und Husserl, in P. Good (ed.), Max Scheler im Gegenwartsgeschen der Philosophie, 
Bern 1975, 83. For more about the open and personal nature of the order of values and 
knowing how to decide for one’s own ordo amoris, cf. M. s. frinGs, The Mind of Max 
Scheler, Milwaukee 1997, 66­69.
75  GW X, 352. Cf. e. siMonoTTi, Max Scheler. Universalismo e verità individuale, 
Brescia 2011, 68­69.
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tion of a phenomenology of the emotions. The essential theoretical characteristic that 
brings Husserl closer to Scheler is the ethical question as to whether it is possible to 
regulate one’s own world of values and one’s own rational­affective dimension, and 
whether such a possibility can be translated into the fundamental motivation for the 
course of one’s own personal education and creation as an authentic vocation.
